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Abstract
Under a market setting, we analyse the impact of legal liability on
prevention, taking into account the possible limited wealth of …rms. We
show that under strict liability, …rms may choose ex ante not to be able
to fully indemnify victims ex post: whatever the market structure, they
may use limited liability strategically by investing in prevention in excess
of what is socially optimal. The negligence rule prevents …rms from over-
investment. For high levels of damages, under both liability rules, …rms
exert an insu¢cient e¤ort of prevention. A welfare analysis establishes
that when the judgment proof problem is acute, the optimal public inter-
vention ranges from banning the production to imposing the negligence
rule.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Litigation as a tool to manage external risks, such as environmental risks, has
been a common practice in the US since the 1980s (see for instance the CERCLA,
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act) and
is under scrutiny by the European Commission (EC, 2000). Legal liability for
damages generally has two goals: providing compensation to victims and limit-
ing risks by creating incentives for lowering the probability and/or the severity
of accidents. With respect to compensation, legal liability faces the issue of the
”judgement proof” injurer that is an injurer unable to pay some portion of the
losses to victims. The fact that a potential injurer’s liability is bounded by its
wealth and the doctrine of limited liability, by reinforcing the externality, has
implications on the prevention activity (Shavell, 1986).
Many prevention e¤orts require better equipment. Modi…ed plants can be
costly. For instance, prevention e¤orts by industrial …rms or farmers for reduc-
ing water pollution in rivers are very di¢cult to implement, even in developed
countries, mainly because of the prohibitive costs (Dinar and Zilberman, 1991).
Firms do invest in prevention if their expected pro…ts are high enough. Florida
1and Davison (2001) show that the voluntary adoption of environmental man-
agement systems is associated with factories that are relatively large.
Furthermore, the costly prevention activity may dramatically reduce the
available funds for indemni…cation in case of a damage. Victims compensation
can also be limited due to the small size of involved producers. By the same
token, the delegation of risky activities from big …rms to small and medium
…rms with a pronounced limited liability weakens the e¤ectiveness of any le-
gal liability regime. Eventually, liability really threatens and in‡uences the
strategies of large …rms. For instance, Aventis recently sold its share of Aventis
CropScience to Bayer partly due to pending liability payments because of the
new StarLink maize, a genetically modi…ed organism (GMO) case (Financial
Times, 2001). Traces of the GMO were found in processed foods, which costs
may force Aventis CropScience to compensate farmers and manufacturers up to
$200 millions in the USA. Aventis faced too many …nancial di¢culties after the
resulting withdrawal of the StarLink maize (EPA, 2000).
In this paper, we investigate the e¢ciency of legal liability, combining insol-
vency considerations with di¤erent market structure con…gurations. The rela-
tionships between liability and insolvency on one hand, and liability and market
structure on the other hand, have been treated in previous research, but none
has investigated the role of market structure on prevention e¤orts under pol-
luters’ potential insolvency.
In one strand of the literature, the issue associated with insolvency assumes
that the …rm’s net worth is exogenous without any reference to competition.
It underlines how incentives to invest in prevention may be diluted. Summers
(1983) and Shavell (1987) show that under di¤erent liability rules, potentially in-
solvent parties exert an e¤ort lower than the socially optimal level since they care
only about the costs they might actually have to pay. In contrast, Lipowsky-
Posey (1993) and Beard (1990) show that, considering a strict liability rule,
potentially insolvent injurers might overinvest in prevention. Since the …rm’s
wealth is exogenous, they cannot question whether the overinvestment in pre-
vention is desirable from a social point of view. Finally, for some other authors,
the judgement proof problem is considered as exogenous (cf. for example Watts,
1998). The second strand of the literature encompasses research focused on lia-
bility rules in a market setting, such as Polinsky (1980), Epple and Raviv (1978),
Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) and more recently Hamilton (1998) and Hamilton
and Sunding (2000). In this research where the assets of the potential injurer
come from a market interaction, the judgment proof problem is neglected favor-
ing the competition intensity and/or the …rms’ entry aspects. Another strand
of literature related to our paper tackles the question of the …rm …nancial struc-
ture with respect to the prevention activity (cf. van’t Veld et al., 1997, Fees and
Hege, 1999a, and Dionne and Spaeter, 2001 for recent contributions). Among
others, the liability rules in‡uence the …rms’ decisions regarding the equity-debt
ratio and generally require the use of extended liability to banks. In our paper,
…rm pro…t is the only source of wealth, enabling us to focus on market structure.
We propose an analysis of …rms’ incentives to invest in prevention under
alternative public regulations, in a case of external damages. An e¢cient reg-
2ulation needs to carefully consider the following aspects. First, the prevention
activity a¤ects …rms’ pro…ts: A higher e¤ort reduces the probability of an ac-
cident and the pro…ts that are available to pay damages; thus, higher e¤ort
increases the probability of being judgment proof. Second, …rms’ pro…ts are af-
fected by the market structure: The more concentratred the market, the higher
the pro…ts and the higher the assets available for indemni…cation; higher pro…ts
reduces the probability of being judgment proof.
Compared to previous approaches, we give a uni…ed framework for studying
the impact of legal liability on prevention, enabling to emphasize the strategic
use of insolvency by …rms. We propose a complete characterization of …rms’ and
regulator’s decisions. Additionnally, we take into account the extent of damage,
the consumers’ willingness to pay and the number of active …rms.
We show that whatever the market structure, under alternative liability
rules, the private optimal level of e¤ort depends on the perspective of pro…ts
and more precisely on the maximum willingness to pay for consumers with
respect to the magnitude of external damages. For certain parameter values,
incentives to invest in prevention are diluted: under strict liability where the
injurer is liable regardless of his e¤ort, …rms either underinvest or overinvest
in prevention. The overinvestment in prevention appears as a pernicious e¤ect
of liability under potential insolvency: It is the result of the strategic use of
the limited wealth and limited liability by …rms. It can be corrected with the
negligence rule under which the injurer is liable only if the level of ”due care”
is not taken.
A welfare analysis exhibits that whatever the number of …rms, the optimal
public intervention ranges from banning the production (or equivalently product
withdrawal of the market) to imposing the negligence rule. Implementing the
socially optimal public intervention requires a precise evaluation of some relevant
parameters, as the extent of the damage, consumers’ maximum willingness to
pay and market structure. This suggests that di¤erent types of pollution may
not be submitted to the same regulation.
The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the …rms’ optimal
strategies under di¤erent legal environments. A comparative static analysis is
then proposed for addressing the question of the impact of market structure on
prevention. The welfare analysis is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a three stage oligopoly model with n …rms and an utilitarian regu-
lator. In the …rst stage, the regulator chooses a legal environment. Four types of
actions are considered: the regulator may choose (i) not to intervene (absence
of regulation), (ii) to implement a strict liability rule or (iii) to implement a
negligence rule, or (iv) to forbid production. The policy selected by the regulator
is publicly known by …rms and consumers. For rules (ii)a n d( iii), we assume
that the Court is able to perfectly identify the responsible …rm and to verify
the extent of the damage. In the second stage, …rms simultaneously choose
3ac o s t l yp r e v e n t i o ne ¤ o r ta n di n c u rt h e… x e dc o s to fp r e v e n t i o n . I nt h et h i r d
stage, sellers simultaneously select a quantity (i.e., Cournot competition). For
each …rm, a damage, D, D>0, representing the cost for the society, may occur
during the production process, that is in stage three, a¤ecting a third party:
potential victims are not part of the producers-consumers relationship (external
damage). We assume that …rms as well as consumers and potential victims are
risk neutral.
All …rms have the same marginal cost of production equal to zero for sim-
plicity. They sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function p(Q)=
a¡Q. The probability of the external damage event is determined by the …rm’s
choice of e¤ort, ¸ 2 [0;1].T h u s(1¡¸) denotes the probability that an environ-
mental accident occurs. No damage occurs for a maximal level of e¤ort equal
to ¸ =1 . By selecting a level of e¤ort, the …rm incurs a …xed (independent of
quantity) cost equal to ¸
2=2: This cost is sunk and increasing and convex in the
level of e¤ort.
Before considering the oligopoly market, we brie‡y describe the …rst-best
allocation. In this economy, the maximum welfare would be reached with (i)a
competitive price equal to the marginal cost of production (namely zero) and (ii)
a unique …rm (namely n =1 ). The presence of this single …rm would facilitate
the maximum economies of scale linked to the …xed cost ¸
2=2 and it would limit
the expected damage for the society equal to (1 ¡ ¸)D. The socially optimal
level of e¤ort minimizes the total expected cost for the society, (1¡¸)D+¸
2=2,
which would lead to an optimal e¤ort equal to ¸
e = Min[D;1].I f0 <D<1;
the e¤ort is ¸
e = D and the probability of getting a damage is 1 ¡ D.I f
D ¸ 1; the e¤ort is ¸
e =1a n dn od a m a g ew i l lo c c u r .N o t et h a tt h ev a l u eo f
¸
e remains unchanged whatever the number of competing …rms. Implementing
this socially optimal level of e¤ort together with a (socially optimal) competitive
price would result in a loss for the seller. This suggests that public intervention
seeking to implement a …rst-best equilibrium would require imposing a price
equal to marginal cost and subsidizing the monopolist through public funding
of the …xed costs associated with the prevention activity. This also suggests that
a second-best (and realistic) policy should take into account the environmental
risk (externality) along with the market structure, namely the number of sellers
n and the resulting solvency problems. As the prevention e¤ort is costly for
the seller, this extra cost can only be covered through a su¢cient market price
(depending on n).
We now turn to the characterization of the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of this three stage game and then conduct a welfare analysis allowing the
selection among the di¤erent regulations.
3 Private choice under alternative rules
As the …rm’s e¤ort results in a …xed (independent of quantity) cost, it does not
interfere with the choice of the output level, so that the production stage (stage
3) can be presented …rst without loss of generality.
43.1 Production stage
Considering that n …rms are active on the market, the per-seller gross pro…t is
(a¡Q)qi, with the overall demand given by Q =
Pn
i=1 qi: The pro…t maximiza-
tion gives the …rst-order condition a ¡ 2qi ¡
Pn
j6=i qj =0 . Under a symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, all …rms adopt the same strategy. Thus with qj = qi
substituted in this …rst-order condition, we get the per-…rm equilibrium quantity,
q¤ = a=(n+1)a n dt h eo v e r a l lq u a n t i t yo ¤ e r e db yt h en …rms is Q¤ = na=(n+1).







A …rm produces a positive quantity as soon as its pro…t net of the prevention
costs, ¼(n) ¡ ¸













3.2 Private E¤ort Choice
The private e¤ort choice is derived considering the production activity gross
pro…t and the legal environment as given.
3.2.1 Absence of regulation
When no liability regulation is imposed by the regulator, the pro…t-maximization
condition leads …rms to make no e¤ort, namely choose ¸
¤ =0 ; so that the prob-
ability of accident is equal to one for each …rm. The society bears all the risk
and the overall externality is equal to nD.
3.2.2 Strict liability
Under strict liability, a …rm incurs some liability payments when the damage
occurs. This gives a su¢cient incentive for each …rm to make a prevention
e¤ort since the court is able to verify perfectly each …rm’s action. The liability
payments depend on the magnitude of net pro…ts, namely the gross pro…t given
by (1) minus the sunk cost of prevention, ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2, with respect to the
damage D. More precisely, when the damage occurs (event with probability
(1 ¡ ¸)), the …rm covers it, as long as the pro…t net of the damage is positive,
namely for ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2 ¸ D: Let the threshold value
b ¸ =
p
2[¼(n) ¡ D].( 3 )
If ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2 <D, ¸>b ¸, the …rm has insu¢cient earnings to totally
cover the damage: the limited liability constraint is satis…ed. In that case,
5we consider that the …rm covers the damage up to the level of its net pro…ts,
meaning that it incurs a liability payment of ¼(n)¡¸
2=2. It is easy to see that
the higher n and D,t h el o w e rb ¸. So we get the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 Considering n, a and D as given, a …rm is either













- or potentially judgment proof with b ¸ 2 (0;1) for b DH(a) >D> b DL(a)).
This de…nition states that for low values of a a n dh i g hv a l u e so fD,a… r m
is always judgment proof. For high values of a and low values of D,a… r m
is always solvent. Finally, for ”intermediate” values of a and D,t h eex ante
choice of e¤ort ¸ made by each …rm may in‡uence its solvency situation. In
other words, …rms may make a strategic use of insolvency for b ¸ 2 (0;1):t h i s
case is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 by the area between the dotted lines b DL(a)
and b DH(a). For these particular values of a and D, a …rm may have to choose
among several prevention levels which in‡uences its solvency situation.




D if ¸ · b ¸ (solvent …rm)
¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2 if ¸>b ¸ (judgement proof …rm)
(4)
Observe that this liability payment depends on the e¤ort level and on the market
structure only when the solvency constraint is e¤ective, namely for ¸>b ¸.I n
that case, the liability payment is a decreasing function in the …xed cost of
prevention and in the number of …rms that are active on the market. Otherwise,
the liability payment only depends on the monetary cost of the accident to
victims.
We now detail the per-…rm pro…t according to the di¤erent events. With
a probability ¸, no damage linked to the …rm production occurs and the per-
…rm net pro…t is ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2. With a probability (1 ¡ ¸), the damage D
linked to the …rm production occurs. The pro…t is ¼(n) ¡ D ¡ ¸
2=2 for the
solvent …rm, and zero for the insolvent …rm (since its net pro…ts are taken for
victims’compensation. So that under strict liability (S), the net ex ante expected




¼(n) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)D ¡ ¸
2=2 if ¸ · b ¸
¸[¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2] if ¸>b ¸
(5)
where ¼(n) is given by (1). Each …rm selects a level of e¤ort that maximizes
¼S(n). The optimal level of e¤ort indeed selected by the …rm will depend on
6the magnitude of pro…t, or more precisely on the maximum willingness to pay
of consumers, a, with respect to the damage, D.L e t


























where frontiers b a(n) and D1(a) allow to delimit the sellers choices. Under strict
liability, the optimal private choice of e¤ort is characterized in the following
proposition:




Consider now a<b a(n). A …rm that is always solvent chooses a socially optimal
level of e¤ort ¸
¤ = ¸
e = D. A …rm that is potentially judgment proof chooses a











Under potential insolvency, the e¤ort can be higher than the socially optimal
e¤ort (if Deq(a) >D>D 1(a))o rl o w e r( i fD>D eq(a)).
Proof: see appendix 1.
Proposition 1 is summarized in Figure 1. The X-axis represents consumers’
maximum willingness to pay, a; for the product, and the Y-axis the value of
the damage, D. First, for high values of a and D (area I), …rms spontaneously
make a maximum e¤ort: the perspective of a high gross pro…t allows a greater
investment in prevention, and the threat of a high liability payment is a su¢cient
incentive to completely eliminate the risk1. Second, when the damage value is
not too high with respect to consumers’ maximum willingness to pay (area II),
…rms choose the socially optimal e¤ort, D<1. The damage, if it occurs, will
be completely borne by …rms that have su¢cient earnings. Eventually, when
the damage is high but the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay is low (area
III), the prevention e¤ort is lower than 1 and the solvency constraint is e¤ective:
…rms won’t be able to pay for the whole damage when it occurs. Note that
under strict liability, for intermediate values of (a;D) -the hatched part of area
III - …rms may choose a level of e¤ort that is greater than the socially optimal
e¤ort. Potentially judgment proof …rms get higher pro…ts by overinvesting in
prevention and hence increasing the probability of bankruptcy than by choosing
the socially optimal level of e¤ort (equal to D). The strategic use of insolvency
is thus underscored.
1This holds with a more sophisticated speci…cation of the cost function (e.g. f ¸2
2 ), which
simply results in a shift in the lower limit of area I (e.g. D = f instead of D =1 ).
73.2.3 Negligence rule
Under a negligence liability rule (N), the regulator sets up a kind of standard
corresponding to a level of due care that a¤ects the pattern of liability payments.
This level of due care is voluntary since it is assumed that (i) this reference
previously admitted by the Court sets a precedent and/or (ii)n oex ante control
is made before the production stage. If …rms respect the level of due care, the
liability payment in case of an accident is driven to zero. If the …rms do not
respect the due care, they will have to incur liability payments similar to the
ones made under strict liability. Considering that the due care is set adequately,
namely equal to the socially optimal level of e¤ort, ¸ = ¸
e = Min[D;1] 2,a… r m ’ s





2=2 for ¸ ¸ ¸
(9)
where ¼S(n) is given by (5). Note that the pro…t ¼4(n) is the highest possible
pro…t since the …rm will not incur any liability payment in case of an accident.
This enables a …rm to increase its level of e¤ort, which would be bene…cial for
the society. Indeed, a …rm has an incentive to respect the standard (namely















Under a negligence rule, the …rms’ optimal choice leads to the following propo-
sition :




Consider now a<b a(n). A …rm that is always solvent chooses a socially optimal
level of e¤ort ¸
¤ = ¸
e = D. A …rm that is potentially judgment proof chooses a





D if D>D 2(a). Idem for a …rm that is always insolvent.
Proof: see appendix 1.
Proposition 2 is summarized in Figure 2. In area I (high values of both a and
D), …rms spontaneously make a maximum e¤ort, just like under strict liability.
For low values of D with respect to consumers’ maximum willingness to pay
(area II), the optimal level of e¤ort is selected and the damage -if it occurs- will
be completely borne by …rms who have su¢cient earnings. Eventually, in area
III the solvency constraint is e¤ective, i.e. …rms will not be able to pay for the
2Setting the negligence due care standard at the socially optimal e¤ort level MinfD;1g
is the most relevant choice since this level corresponds to a balanced trade-o¤ between the
probability of insolvency and the probability of environmental accident (See Burrows, 1999,
for an analysis of the simultaneous use of regulation and liability, considering a negligence due
care that may be equal to, above or below the regulated standard).
8whole damage, as the consumers’ willingness to pay is low and the damage is
high. In this last case, the negligence rule is not a su¢cient tool for reaching
the optimal level of prevention.
One interesting consequence in that under the negligence rule, …rms would
never overinvest in prevention as under strict liability (the former hatched area
in Figure 1 is now part of area II of Figure 2, where the socially optimal level
of prevention is selected). The negligence rule allows each …rm to dodge its
liability payment by respecting the standard. For a lower level of e¤ort, the
liability payment would be made up to the available assets.
Under a negligence rule, the socially optimal level of e¤ort is more often
implemented. In particular, for the hatched area in Figure 1, the …rm has a
higher pro…t respecting the socially optimal level of e¤ort than choosing a higher
level of e¤ort resulting in a higher e¤ort cost and hence an higher probability
of insolvency without any bene…ts in terms of liability payments.
To sum up, the main di¤erence between the two liability rules is that under
a negligence rule, the judgment proof problem may lead the …rm to exert a
suboptimal level of e¤ort, whereas the …rm may overinvest (or underinvest) in
e¤ort under a strict liability rule.
3.3 The market structure
We now consider the impact of the market structure captured by the number
of active …rms on private decisions of e¤ort. The higher n; the higher is the
threshold value, b a(n) on the X-axis of Figures 1 and 2. Thus, leaving other pa-
rameters unchanged, the maximum e¤ort ¸
¤ =1(such that the risk completely
disappears) is less likely to be adopted. Recall that this level of e¤ort is selected
for a ¸ b a(n) and D ¸ 1; under any liability rule. More generally, an increase in
the number of …rms, n; leads to a decrease of areas I and II towards the East
and an increase of area III towards the East and the SouthEast (in Figures 1







Proposition 3 The less concentrated the market, the less often the socially
optimal level of e¤ort is implemented, and the lower the e¤ort level under in-
solvency (e¤ective or potential).
This highlights the tradeo¤ between market structure and risk management.
Proposition 4 The strategic use of insolvency under strict liability is observed
whatever the market structure.
The market structure appears as an important parameter for the private
…rm. First, a monopoly may well choose an ine¢cient level of e¤ort which
contrasts with the common idea that a monopoly will be more e¢cient with
respect to prevention than a duopoly or an oligopoly. In addition, for particular
values of a and D, a monopoly may choose to overinvest in prevention whereas
9for the same values of a and D, a duopoly would choose to underinvest in
prevention. Also, the fact that a suboptimal level of e¤ort emerges under both
strict liability and negligence rules, whatever the market structure contrasts wih
Spulber (1989, Chapter 14) who opposed the e¢ciency of liability rules under
a competitive situation to the ine¢ciency of liability rules under a monopoly
situation.
The case of a competitive situation, excluded up to now, may be captured
by making n goes to in…nity. When n ! +1, the optimal private e¤ort choice
corresponds to the choice under no regulation, ¸
¤ =0 , and the strategic use
of insolvency disappears (as D1(a) ! 0, b a(n)=( n +1 )
p







The market structure may as well be an important parameter for the regu-
lator in his choice of a legal environment as we shall see in the following section.
4 Welfare analysis
We now consider the viewpoint of a utilitarian regulator. Comparison of welfares
as well as positivity conditions on various welfares give some informations about
t h ea c t i o nt ob ec h o s e nb yt h eg o v e r n m e n tg i v e n(a;D).L e t
DSOD(a)=1 ¡
p

















Proposition 5 Consider …rst a ¸ b a(n). Both liability rules are equivalent and
preferred to no regulation.
Consider now a<b a(n).
If D · D1(a), both liability rules are equivalent and preferred to no regulation.
Idem if DJP(a) >D>D 2(a).
If Min[DSOD(a);D 2(a)] >D>D 1(a), a negligence rule is preferred to a strict
liability rule.
Finally, if DSOD(a) >D>M a x [D2(a);D JP(a)], banning the activity is the
preferred action. Idem if D ¸ DSOD(a).
The proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 3. The two liability rules are
equivalent and preferred to no regulation, for (i)h i g hv a l u e so fa whatever
t h ed a m a g ev a l u eD ( w i t ha ne ¤ o r te q u a lt oo n e ) ,( ii) relatively low values
of D compared to a such that D<D 1(a) ( w i t ha ne ¤ o r te q u a lt oD), and
(iii) relatively high values of D compared to a such that D<D JP(a) and





3). For high values of D and
small a (hatched area), banning the activity could be welfare maximizing as
10the solvency problem is really acute. In this case the surplus resulting from
the exchange does not o¤set the expected damages. For values of a and D such
that D1(a) <D<D 2(a), a negligence rule is preferred to a strict liability rule,
the former allowing to implement the socially optimal e¤ort. The negligence
rule allows the reduction of the ine¢ciency associated with a strict liability rule
which results in a overinvestment in prevention by the …rm.3
The market structure is important in the choice of a legal environment. For
some particular values of a and D, the regulator may choose to ban the activity
for a duopoly or even an oligopoly whereas for the same values of a and D,a
monopoly may be allowed to produce but subjected for example to a negligence
rule. These results suggest that a complete industrial organization analysis must
be conducted for selecting the appropriate regulation.
5 One extension: The internality case
One interesting extension is to investigate the strategic use of insolvency when
the damage is at least partially internalized by consumers, as it is the case for
products safety.
All assumptions of section 2 are kept. We only modify the assumption
linked to the overall damage (1 ¡ ¸)nD.L e t ¹ 2 [0;1] denote the share of
the damage incurred by the third party and (1 ¡ ¹) the share incurred by
the consumers. The third party incurs ¹(1 ¡ ¸)nD and the consumers in-
cur (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¸)nD; where consumers have rational expectation concern-
ing this expected damage and perfect information concerning ¸.T h ev a l u e
¹ =0refers to a pure internality case, while ¹ =1refers to a pure exter-
nality case (studied previously). The consumers’ expected indirect utility is
now u(Q;p)=aQ¡Q2=2¡pQ¡(1¡¹)(1¡¸)nD,w h e r eQ denotes the overall
demand (equal to the production). Thus, @us(Q;p)=@Q =0 ; leads to the same
inverse demand p = a¡Q as before. This leads to the same equilibrium quantity
Q¤ and price p¤ given in section 3.1. However, the consumer now decides to buy
some products when the surplus coming from the exchange is higher than the
damage that they incur, namely for u(Q¤;p ¤) ¸ 0.U s i n g cs(n) given by (2),
the consumers decide to purchase goods when cs(n) ¸ (1¡¹)(1¡¸)nD.F i r m s
expect this consumers’ behavior.
Compared to the previous study under externality, the same methodology
could be applied to the internality case with ¹ =0 .
Under the absence of rule, …rms strategies di¤er from the externality case
(presented in subsection 3.2.1). Each …rm maximizes the gross pro…t given
by (1) minus the sunk cost of prevention, namely the net pro…t ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2,
subject to the constraint that consumers purchase; cs(n) ¸ (1 ¡ ¸)nD.T h i s
3This welfare analysis could be completed by taking into account the costs of the di¤erent
regulations, including the cost linked to the Court. For instance, the complete prohibition of
the production (with all the associated controls) could be more costly than the liability rules.











T h e… r m sc h o o s et h el e v e l¸ = ¸I as soon as ¼(n) ¡ ¸
2
I=2 > 0 that is for









2. Otherwise, …rms choose not to
invest in prevention (¸ =0 ) either because …rms get negative pro…ts (this is the
case for D>D P(a)) or because the maximum willingness to pay for consumers
is so high with respect to the level of damage that incurring the risk is not an






). In absence of regulation, incentives to
invest in prevention are diluted: …rms choose an e¤ort level that di¤ers from
the socially optimal one. Moreover, for values of a and D, such that the social
optimum e¤ort is 1,a s¸I < 1, …rms underinvest in prevention. For values of a
and D such that the social optimum e¤ort is D, it could be that …rms overinvest
in prevention.
How does regulation could reduce these ine¢ciencies ? Under a strict liability
rule, in case of an accident, consumers are fully indemni…ed as long as ¼(n) ¡
¸
2=2 ¸ D that is for ¸>b ¸ where b ¸ =
p
2[¼(n) ¡ D]. A …rm solves the following
optimization problem
Max ¼(n) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)D ¡ ¸
2=2
s:t: cs(n) ¸ 0
In case of a judgment proof …rm, ¸ · b ¸, consumers are partially compensated
and they buy the product as long as cs(n) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)n
³





A potential judgment proof …rm will choose an e¤ort level solution to
Max ¸[¼(n) ¡ ¸
2=2]
s:t: cs(n) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)n
³





Under liability regulation, results are similar to the externality case : some
ine¢ciencies are reduced. Except for high values of D with respect to a for
which consumers prefer not to purchase the good: for these parameters values,
one has market closure due to the absence of demand.
6 Concluding remarks and other possible exten-
sions
Using a very simple model of oligopoly under alternative rules, we have shown
that the judgement proof problem can result in an over- or underinvestment in
prevention, and that the negligence rule does not necessary solve the judgment
12proof problem. Our paper underlines that an e¢cient policy for managing exter-
nal risks entails a precise analysis of the complete environment which amounts
to a cost-bene…t analysis. This is particularly true for the cases where the judg-
ment proof appears as a strategic variable for the …rms. We showed that both
liability rules are limited for impeding the risk of damages, when the extent of
damage becomes relatively large compared to the buyers’ maximum willingness
to pay. The result suggests that alternative instruments such as banning the
production and/or limiting the number of …rms have to be used.
New instruments in the …eld of public regulation of environmental risks could
also be interesting with respect to the strategic use of insolvency. For exam-
ple, recent theoretical papers have considered the possible extension of liability
to banks or insurance companies (cf. Pitchford, 1995, and Boyer and La¤ont,
1997). The requirement that potential polluting industries set monetary guar-
anties aside (bonds) before the beginning of the industrial activity may be an
alternative solution to potential insolvency. More generally, …nancial responsi-
bility may mitigate the insolvency problem (cf. Fees and Hege, 1999b). Such
measures of course modify …rms’ incentives with respect to prevention.
13APPENDIX 1 : Private Strategies
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 : At interior solutions, …rst order conditions of
pro…t maximization with respect to the prevention e¤ort level are:
D ¡ ¸
¤ =0 if ¸
¤ · b ¸
¼(n) ¡ ¸
¤2=2 ¡ ¸
¤2 =0 if ¸
¤ > b ¸







¡ D + D2=2 if ¸










¤ > b ¸





2=3=1 ). The optimal choice is the socially optimal e¤ort level
¸
¤ = ¸
e = Min[D;1] whether one has D<1or D>1.
Consider now a<b a(n). A …rm that is solvent for sure chooses the socially
optimal e¤ort, ¸
¤ = D. A potentially judgment proof …rm may choose between
¸




2=3. It chooses the socially optimal level of e¤ort





selected when D>D 1(a). This level of e¤ort is greater than the socially optimal
level ¸
e = D when D · Deq(a) and lower otherwise.¥
Proof of proposition 2: Consider …rst that a ¸ b a(n). The optimal choice
is the socially optimal e¤ort level ¸
¤ = ¸
e = Min[D;1] whether one has D<1or
D>1.
Now consider values of (a;D) such that a<b a(n) and D<1. A …rm that is
always solvent chooses ¸
¤ = D. A …rm either insolvent for sure or potentially





¤ = D.W h e n (a;D)
are such that D · Deq(a),t h eo p t i m a lp r i v a t ee ¤ o r ti sD: with this level of
prevention e¤ort, the …rm escapes its liability and incurs a minimal e¤ort cost.
When D>D eq(a), a …rm that is insolvent for sure or potentially insolvent has
incentives to meet the standard if the pro…t net of liability payments is greater




















that is D · D2(a). Hence, for D2(a) ¸ D>D eq(a), ¸






For values of (a;D) such that a<b a(n) and D =1 , that is the standard





14D =1 , and a …rm that is either always judgment proof or potentially insolvent
has no incentives to respect the standard. Indeed, for such a …rm to choose the


























2=3 can be implemented.¥





and b a(n) with respect to n.¥
Proof of proposition 4: Direct since the relevant expressions character-
izing the strategic use of bankruptcy under strict liability, Deq(a) and D1(a)
depend on n.¥
APPENDIX 2 : Welfare Analysis
By taking into account the fact that the prohibition of the production leads
to a welfare equal to zero, the following table gives the optimal welfare for the














































P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 :Consider …rst a ¸ b a(n), both liability rules pre-
scribe the socially optimal level of e¤ort, either D or 1.A sWSOD >W 0 > 0
and WSO1 >W 0 > 0, both rules are equivalent and preferred to no regulation.
Let now consider a<b a(n).
If D<D 1(a), both liability rules prescribe D and one as WSOD >W 0 > 0
so that both liability rules are equivalent and preferred to no regulation. Idem





has WJP >W 0.
If Min[DSOD(a);D 2(a)] >D>D 1(a), a negligence rule prescribes D




2=3.A s WSOD >W JP,
15a negligence rule is preferred to a strict liability rule. And as WSOD >W 0,a
negligence rule is also preferred to no regulation.









2=3 leads to a negative welfare. So that to forbid
the activity is the optimal action for the regulator. Idem if D ¸ DSOD(a):





2=3 under a strict liability rule and WJP <W SOD < 0.A n d f o r D ¸







































Figure 3: Optimal action for the regulator
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